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Partisan gerrymandering poses a threat to democracy. Moreover, the complexity of the district-
ing task may exceed human capacities. One potential solution is using computational models
to automate the districting process by optimizing objective and open criteria, such as how spa-
tially compact districts are. We formulated one such model that minimized pairwise distance
between voters within a district. Using US Census Bureau data, we confirmed our prediction
that the difference in compactness between the computed and actual districts would be greatest
for states that are large and therefore difficult for humans to properly district given their limited
capacities. The computed solutions highlighted differences in how humans and machines solve
this task with machine solutions more fully optimized and displaying emergent properties not
evident in human solutions. These results suggest a division of labour in which humans debate
and formulate districting criteria whereas machines optimize the criteria to draw the district
boundaries. We discuss how criteria can be expanded beyond notions of compactness to in-
clude other factors, such as respecting municipal boundaries, historic communities, relevant
legislation, etc.
One of the greatest threats to democracy, particularly in
the USA, is gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the prac-
tice of (re)drawing electoral district boundaries to advance
the interests of the controlling political faction. The term is
a portmanteau, coined in 1812 when people noticed that a
district — approved by the then governor of Massachusetts,
Elbridge Gerry — resembled a salamander (Martis, 2008).
Gerrymandering leads to districts with unnecessarily vi-
sually complex shapes, e.g., North Carolina (see Figure 3c).
Although there are laws (both at the state and federal level)
to safeguard the rights of citizens (including minorities) dur-
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ing the redistricting process, in practice these laws do little
to reduce partisan gerrymandering (Issacharoff, 2002). Wor-
ryingly, gerrymandering is on the rise (Stephanopoulos &
McGhee, 2015) due to partisan actions of both Republicans
and Democrats (Bazelon, 2017). In the 17 states where Re-
publicans controlled the redistricting process, they secured
72% of the available seats on only 52% of the vote. Mirror-
ing, in the 6 states where Democrats controlled the districting
process, they secured 71% of the seats on 56% of the vote.
The two main gerrymandering strategies are packing
and cracking (Altman, Amos, McDonald, & Smith, 2015).
Cracking dilutes people likely to vote for the opposition, as-
signing them to as many districts as possible, see Figure 1b.
One cracking tactic is to dilute urban voting blocs by hav-
ing multiple districts from the countryside converge like the
spokes of a wheel at a city’s fractured hub. In contrast, pack-
ing concentrates people who will likely vote for the opposi-
tion within a small number of districts, rendering their vote
inconsequential in the remaining districts, see Figure 1c.
One possible solution to partisan gerrymandering is to rely
on computer algorithms to impartially draw districts (Vick-
rey, 1961). In theory, there is no reason why such a solution
could not be adopted in the USA. Indeed, many states within
Mexico use computer algorithms to district (Altman, Magar,
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Figure 1. An illustrative example of three redistricting plans.
The 50 voters (circles) are grouped into 5 districts (polygons)
with the background colour denoting the winning party. The
purple party (60% of voters) secures 60%, 100%, and 40%
of the seats under the three plans, respectively. a) Compact,
fair: the proportion of wins (60%) by the purple party reflects
its overall level of voter support. b) Compact, not fair: all
five districts are won by the purple party because the orange
vote has been cracked. c) Not compact, not fair: the purple
party has been packed into two districts (its only wins) and
cracked in the remaining districts. We recommend the video
that motivated this figure (Taylor, 2016).
McDonald, & Trelles, 2014; García et al., 2015; Gutiérrez-
Ándrade et al., 2016; Ponsich et al., 2017). Moving to com-
putational redistricting would “elevate the legislative redis-
tricting debate from a battle over line drawing to a discussion
of representational goals” (Browdy, 1990, p. 1381). In other
words, the role for humans would be to decide and formalise
the criteria (e.g., people within a district should be close to
one another) and the computer’s job would be to find the
best solution without human tinkering. Thus, the appeal of
automation is twofold: a) open-source computer algorithms
can be written to follow objective criteria absent corrupting
influences; and b) computers are able to toil away optimising
the objective criteria in contrast to humans who have limited
cognitive capacity and time to devote. While the first point,
namely that purposeful gerrymandering occurs and leads to
unfair solutions may be obvious, the second point may be
less so. However, from a psychological perspective, it is
clear that humans do not consider all logically possible so-
lutions in combinatoric problems (e.g., districting), but may
instead rely on shortcuts and general organisational princi-
ples (Palmer, 1990). Counterintuitively, some of what we
perceive as gerrymandering may simply reflect that humans
are not very good at the districting task.
In light of these observations, we tested the
psychologically-motivated prediction that differences in
compactness between the computed and actual districts will
be greatest for states that are large and therefore difficult
for humans to properly district. To evaluate this prediction,
we devised a novel clustering algorithm to redistrict the
USA’s 435 congressional districts (more populous states
are allotted more seats). The algorithm maximises a notion
of compactness by minimising the average mean distance
between people within the same district, cf. (Arnold, 2017;
Chen & Rodden, 2013; Hess, Weaver, Siegfeldt, Whelan, &
Zitlau, 1965)
In accord with federal law, our novel algorithm includes
an additional constraint to create clusters (i.e., districts) of
roughly the same cardinality (i.e., population). We refer
to our algorithm as weighted k-means because it is based
on k-means clustering (Arthur & Vassilvitskii, 2007; Lloyd,
1982). Details are provided in the Methods section and the
open-source code is available to reproduce the reported re-
sults at https://osf.io/5fepu/.
Materials and Methods
This section details how the US Census Bureau data
was preprocessed, provides details on the weighted k-means
model.
Census Data
US Census Bureau data were used to perform the district
clusterings reported in the main text. For clustering, we used
the smallest available geographic unit, known as a census
block. The US Census Bureau collects data for just over
11 million census blocks of which almost 5 million have a
population of 0. The last decennial census occurred in 2010.
However, as recently as 2015, the US Census Bureau con-
ducted the ACS (American Community Survey), which is a
survey at one level above the block level, which is referred
to as a block group. Using these 2015 counts, we estimated
the population of each census block in 2015 by calculating
its population share of its block group in 2010 and, assuming
these proportions had not changed, updated the block pop-
ulations based on the 2015 ACS. Notice that our population
estimates for census blocks in 2015 is not constrained to be
an integer.
INSERT SHORTTITLE COMMAND IN PREAMBLE 3
Census blocks in urban areas tend to be geographically
smaller but more populated. Based on our estimates combin-
ing the 2010 and 2015 data, the mean population of a census
block is 29.49 with a median of 3.41 people. The mean area
of a census block 1.11 km2 with a median of 0.04 km2.
Initialisation
The manner in which clusters are initialised will affect
the quality of the final solution because our algorithm, like
k-means which it generalises, moves toward a local opti-
mum. We initialise the centroids using the procedure from
k-means++ (Arthur & Vassilvitskii, 2007).
Weighted k-means Algorithm
Weighted k-means generalises k-means by preferring clus-
ters of roughly the same cardinality (i.e., number of mem-
bers) with the strength of this preference determined by a
parameter value. Like k-means, in each iteration, items are
assigned to the nearest cluster and at the end of iteration the
position of the cluster (i.e., centroid) is updated to reflect its
members’ positions. After a number of iterations, the algo-
rithm converges to a local optimum. Weighted k-means dif-
fers from k-means by penalising clusters with more members
such that distances to these clusters are multiplied by a scal-
ing factor reflecting the cluster’s cardinality. The weight for
cluster i is
wi =
|Ci|α
K∑
j=1
|C j|α
, (1)
where |Ci| is the cardinality of cluster i, K is the number of
clusters, and α is a parameter that determines how much to
penalise clusters with a disproportionate number of mem-
bers.
To stabilise solutions across iterations and prevent oscilla-
tions, the scaling factor si,t for cluster i at time t (i.e., iteration
t) is calculated as a weighted combination of the previous
scaling factor si,t−1 and wi
si,t = βsi,t−1 + (1 − β)wi, (2)
where β is a control parameter in the range [0, 1). In the first
iteration, each si,0 is initialised to 1K where K is the number
of clusters.
The scaled distance of point x to the cluster i is
ds(x, µi) = si,t × d(x, µi), (3)
where µi is the position of cluster i and d is the distance met-
ric, which in this contribution is great-circle distance (also
known as orthodromic or geodesic distance, estimated using
the haversine formula), which respects the curvature of the
Earth.
Finally, argminids(x, µi) is used to find the nearest
weighted cluster i from point x, to which x will be assigned.
Notice that this algorithm is identical to k-means when α is 0.
As α increases, the constraint of equal cardinality becomes
firmer.
Parameter Fitting
Solutions are only considered that converge and for which
the cardinalities of the clusters are in line with that of actual
congressional districts. In principle, one could use any pa-
rameter search procedure to find α and β that minimised the
measure we report, which is the pairwise distance of voters
within a district (i.e., cluster). For example, one could use
grid search to consider all possible combinations (at some
granularity) of α and β.
However, given available computing resources, we
adopted a more efficient procedure informed by our under-
standing of the algorithm’s behaviour (i.e., smaller α values
lead to tighter clusterings). The parameter search procedure
began with α set to 0 and increased α until an acceptable
solution was found. At each level of α, β was set to .5 and
increased by .1 after a simulation failure until β exceeded
its range. At that point, α was increased by .1 and the pro-
cess was repeated with β set to .5. This procedure termi-
nated when an acceptable solution was found. At that point, a
finer-grained optimisation was performed, which considered
α values up to .1 lower than first acceptable value found.
Results
Our clustering algorithm created improved maps for ev-
ery state, see Figure 2. Please visit http://redistrict.science
to compare the actual and automated districting plans for
any address in the USA. We define the improvement for
each state as the ratio of pairwise distances within dis-
tricts between our solution and the actual districts. This
metric favours districts in which voters are tightly clus-
tered spatially, leading to a mean improvement across
states of 0.796 (i.e,. about 20%) with standard devia-
tion 0.0858. To test our main prediction, a regression
model was fit to the state improvement scores with num-
ber of districts, and square of number of districts serving
as predictors, R2 = 0.550, F(2, 40) = 24.47, p ≈ 0.
Both predictors in the fit, − 0.0149(number of districts) +
0.0002(number of districts)2 + 0.9027, were statistically sig-
nificant, t(40) = −5.654, p ≈ .0 and t(40) = 3.879, p ≈ 0,
respectively. Consistent with our prediction, these results
suggest that the cognitive demands of drawing districts for
larger states may tax human capacities. Thus, some of the
unfairness in current solutions may be unintentional, as op-
posed to wholly attributable to deliberate gerrymandering for
political gain.
The regression also included a quadratic term for the num-
ber of districts that confirmed the intuition that the complex-
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Figure 2. Map of the USA showing how much more compact each state’s districts would be under computational districting.
Red-coloured states would improve the most after using our algorithm to form districts that are compact by minimising the
pairwise distances between people within a district. Blue-coloured states would improve the least from computational redis-
tricting, though still show an improvement in within district pairwise distances. States with grey hatching, e.g, Alaska (bottom
left), have only one district.
ity of the task should not scale linearly with the number of
districts because the clustering is spatial and local interac-
tions dominate. For instance, there are natural groupings
and locality within big states, e.g., what is drawn for Los
Angeles is unlikely to strongly affect what is drawn in San
Francisco. People likely segment maps hierarchically into
regional groupings to reduce processing demands, as they do
in other map reasoning tasks (Graham, Joshi, & Pizlo, 2000),
which may explain fallacious conclusions like that Reno lies
east of Los Angeles and that Atlanta is east of Detroit (My-
ers, 2002). Overall, the district size results indicate that states
with fewer districts are easier to draw properly, which sug-
gests that state size may be another cause of “accidental ger-
rymandering” (Chen & Rodden, 2013). The residuals from
this regression model can be interpreted as how gerryman-
dered each state is, adjusting for population. This analysis
suggests that Arizona is the most gerrymandered state (see
Table 1 for the complete ranking).
Let us turn to some specific examples for redistricting so-
lutions (for an interactive map, visit http://redistrict.science).
For Iowa, which uses a neutral commission to draw district
boundaries (Levitt, 2011), our automated solution uses fewer
segments (Figure 3b) than the more complex actual solution
(Figure 3a). In the case of North Carolina, where maps are
drawn through a partisan process, improvements are also ev-
ident (Figure 3c, d).
Notwithstanding Utah’s “long tradition of requiring that
Table 1
States sorted by their residuals from the regression model
described in the main text. A state’s residual can be in-
terpreted as how gerrymandered the state is after taking
into account the number of districts, with negative resid-
uals indicating greater gerrymandering. Of course, there
could be other important covariates in addition to popu-
lation size.
State Residuals State Residuals State Residuals
AZ -0.1482 ME -0.0329 NE 0.0267
MD -0.0820 NM -0.0220 OR 0.0399
LA -0.0792 NH -0.0158 SC 0.0401
OH -0.0747 WA -0.0122 WI 0.0419
VA -0.0747 NJ -0.0043 CT 0.0426
UT -0.0632 CA -0.0036 MA 0.0437
TX -0.0623 IA -0.0022 MS 0.0458
NC -0.0551 AL 0.0027 OK 0.0527
IL -0.0538 HI 0.0137 MN 0.0563
TN -0.0503 GA 0.0181 FL 0.0568
PA -0.0475 KY 0.0203 KS 0.0603
WV -0.0466 ID 0.0217 NV 0.0628
RI -0.0458 MO 0.0239 IN 0.0813
CO -0.0386 AR 0.0244 MI 0.1047
NY 0.1345
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Figure 3. Actual and computed district maps for Iowa (a, b) and North Carolina (c, d). Computed solutions are shown in
green to the right of the actual congressional districts. Darker areas on the map (census tracts) are more densely populated.
districts be [...] reasonably compact” (Christensen & Taylor,
2001), the densely populated northern conurbation of Provo,
Salt Lake City, and West Valley City, is cracked, diluting the
urban vote by recruiting parts of the countryside, reaching
to the southern border of the state (Figure 4a). In the com-
puted solution, the urban area of West Valley and Salt Lake
City is assigned to a single urban district, as is Provo and its
surrounding conurbation (Figure 4b).
The automated districting of Arizona showcases an emer-
gent property of our algorithm that human-drawn maps have
not displayed, namely that districts can be embedded within
one another, such as a small densely populated urban district
encircled by a large sparsely populated rural district (i.e.,
shaped like a doughnut). Rather than crack Tuscon across
3 districts (Figure 4c), the algorithm settled on a doughnut
structure (Figure 4d).
An interesting case of convergence between human and
algorithm is the case of Nebraska (Figure 4e). Our algorithm
followed in the footsteps of those who districted Nebraska
(Figure 4f), capturing the same transition from fully urban
(east) to fully rural (west). However, the smooth radiating
boundaries surrounding the capital, Omaha, are more com-
pact (optimised) in the automated solution.
One question is which solution potential voters prefer. In
the first 3 days http://redistrict.science was live, 367 self-
identified US citizens indicated whether they preferred our
algorithmic solution or the actual districting for their state.
The vast majority of respondents preferred the computational
solution (90.7% overall; 91.1% when IP address location and
state matched) with the pattern holding across states.
Discussion
In summary, we applied our novel weighted k-means al-
gorithm to US Census Bureau data to redistrict the USA’s
435 congressional districts and compared the computed solu-
tions to actual districts. The results confirmed our prediction
that larger states would tend to show greater improvement,
suggesting that the complexity of the districting task may
overwhelm humans’ ability to find optimal solutions. One
startling conclusion is that some of what we view as purpose-
ful gerrymandering may reflect human cognitive limitations.
At this juncture, this conclusion is more a provocative con-
jecture than an established finding. Further work is needed
to evaluate how human cognitive biases and limitations may
contribute to gerrymandering.
In light of our results, we advocate a division of labour
between human and machine. Stakeholders should openly
debate and justify the districting criteria. Once the criteria
are determined by humans, it should be left to the comput-
ers to draw the lines given humans’ cognitive limitations and
potential partisan bias. We offer one of many potential so-
lutions. The computer code, like ours used in these simu-
lations, should be open-source (to allow for replication and
scrutiny) and straightforward to provide confidence in its op-
eration.
Political, ethical, scholarly, and legal debate should play
a central role in determining the optimisation criteria. For
example, instead of choosing the mean pairwise distance be-
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Figure 4. Actual and computed district maps for Utah (a, b), Arizona (c, d), and Nebraska (e, f). Computed solutions are
shown in green to the right of the actual congressional districts. Darker areas on the map (census tracts) are more densely
populated.
tween constituents, we could have used travel time to capture
the effects of geographical barriers, such as rivers. Even a
measure as simple as travel time raises a number of ideolog-
ical considerations that should be debated, such as the mode
of transportation (e.g., public, on foot, or by automobile) to
adopt. Other factors could be included in the criteria, such as
respecting municipal boundaries, historic communities, the
racial composition of districts, partisan affiliation, etc. For
our demonstration, we chose perhaps the simplest reason-
able criteria, but in application the choice of criteria would
ideally involve other factors after lengthy debate involving a
number of stakeholders. These debates should elevate demo-
cratic discourse by focusing minds on principles and values,
as opposed to how to draw maps for partisan advantage.
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Although we focused on US districting, similar issues
arise in other democracies. For example, the UK is currently
reviewing the boundaries for its parliamentary constituen-
cies. Our work suggests that, even though the UK uses polit-
ically neutral commissions to guide the redistricting process,
the results could disadvantage certain voters due to the cog-
nitive limitations of those drawing the maps.
Our algorithm is only one possible solution to open and
automated districting. The algorithm selected could be the
one that best performs according to an objective criteria. Dif-
ferent algorithms will provide qualitatively different geome-
tries, which itself could inform selection. For example, the
shortest splitline algorithm recursively splits a state into dis-
tricts restricting itself to North-South and East-West straight
lines. The balanced k-means algorithm (Chang, Nie, Ma,
& Yang, 2014) is very similar to our own algorithm. It
minimizes the standard k-means loss function plus an ad-
ditional weighted term that takes into account the number
of members (i.e., people) in each cluster (i.e., district). The
range of possible geometries in balanced k-means is between
those of the shortest splitline algorithm and our weighted k-
means. Balanced k-means will create district boundaries that
are lines (at any angle, not just North-South and East-West)
to partition the space into a Voronoi diagram. In contrast, our
algorithm, which weights distance by cluster, can form dis-
tricts within districts (see Figure 4) and borders can be curved
(see Figure 4). No matter the choice of algorithm, cluster-
ing is an NP-Hard problem such that the optimal solution is
not guaranteed unless all possible assignments are consid-
ered (Mahajan, Nimbhorkar, & Varadarajan, 2012), which is
computationally impossible in most cases. In practice, ran-
dom restart with different initial conditions and other opti-
mization techniques can provide high-quality solutions.
We believe this automated, yet inclusive and open, ap-
proach to redistricting is preferable to the current system in
the USA for which the populace’s only remedy is the court
system, which has proven ineffective in this arena. The law
and case history for gerrymandering in the USA is complex
and we will not feign to provide an adequate review here.
However, two key points are a) courts are reactive and pro-
ceed slowly relative to the pace of election cycles (i.e., be-
fore any action would be taken, disenfranchisement would
have already occurred); and b) the Supreme Court of the
United States has never struck down a politically gerryman-
dered district (Liptak, 2017). However, recently, courts have
taken a more active role in addressing cases of gerryman-
dering. After centuries of gerrymandering complaints, for
the first time the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case
concerning whether Wisconsin’s partisan gerrymandering is
in breach of the First Amendment and the Voting Rights Act
(Liptak, 2017). Likewise, recent verdicts concerning district-
ing in North Carolina and Pennsylvania highlight a grow-
ing consensus that politicians should not have a freehand in
drawing maps for partisan advantage.
In such legal cases, the concept of voting efficiency,
along with comparison to randomly generated maps (Chik-
ina, Frieze, & Pegden, 2017), has prominently featured
(Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2015). The basic concept is
that votes for the losing party in a district are “wasted" (re-
lated to cracking) as well as votes for the winning party over
what is needed to secure victory (related to packing). Formal
measures of efficiency can be readily calculated and com-
pared (Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 2015). Although these
measures have their place in illustrating disparities, we find it
preferable to focus on optimising core principles and values,
rather than rarify the status quo and reduce voters to partisan
apparatchiks whose preferences and turnout tendencies are
treated as fixed across election cycles, which they are not.
In contrast to voter efficiency approaches, an algorithm
like ours will naturally lead to cases where groups “self-
gerrymander”, such as when like-minded communities form
in densely populated areas (Chen & Rodden, 2013; McCarty,
Poole, & Rosenthal, 2009). However, it is debatable whether
these votes are truly wasted. Representatives for these rela-
tively homogeneous communities may have a stronger voice
and feel emboldened to advocate for issues that are important
to their community, even when these positions may not be
popular on the national stage. After all, almost by definition,
every important social movement, such as the Civil Rights
movement or campaigns for LGBT equality, are not popu-
lar at inception. Nevertheless, concepts like voter efficiency
could be included in the optimisation criteria for algorithms
like ours. When faced with complex issues as to what is
fair, the best solution may be the division of labour what we
advocate: humans formalise objective criteria through open
discourse and the computers search for an optimal solution
unburdened by human limitations.
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